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On the Same Page
The Value of Paid and Volunteer Leaders
Sharing Mental Models in Churches
Stephanie T. Solansky, Dennis Duchon,
Donde Ashmos Plowman, and Patricia G. Martínez
Abstract
We examine the idea that mental models shared among paid and volunteer leaders are associated with improved financial performance in nonprofit organizations. Our empirical analysis of thirty-seven churches yields
evidence that organizations are more effective if paid and volunteer leaders
have a shared task mental model—that is, if they report similar conceptualizations of organizational goals and decision-making processes. These findings suggest that the extent of leaders’ agreement on organizational goals
and the processes of how decisions are made matter for organizational performance. We argue that it is as important to ensure that everyone is on the
same page with regard to goals and how decisions are made as it is to have
the “right” goals or right decision processes in place. Implications for practice and future research on shared mental models are discussed.

“We don’t see things as they are, we see them as we are.” —Anais Nin

G

etting people “on the same page” means having people see
an issue the same way, and share the same reference points,
the same images, the same vocabulary. Such cognitive unity
is believed to facilitate understanding, communication, decision
making, and ultimately effective operations. Yet a number of research studies suggest that achieving this cognitive unity is difficult because individuals tend to rely on their own idiosyncratic representation of an issue. For example, managers’ perceptions differ
among one another (Mezias and Starbuck, 2003) and people’s organizational roles affect what they see (Mezias, Grinyer, and Guth,
2001; Payne and Pugh, 1976).
Getting people on the same page essentially acknowledges the socially constructed nature of organizational life (Weick, 1995), which
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means that factuality is important only to the extent that people can
interpret and understand it, and they will interpret and understand
facts consistent with who they believe themselves to be (Starbuck
and Milliken, 1988; Hogarth, 1980). Getting people on the same page
requires creation of shared representations or shared mental models
of issues, which in turn enables group or organizational functioning
(Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 2001; Gibson, 2001; Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994). More formally, shared mental models refer to the
knowledge structures held by people “that enable them to form accurate explanations and expectations for the task, and, in turn, to coordinate their actions and adapt their behavior to demands of the
task and other actors and levels in the system” (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Converse, 1993, p. 228). A shared mental model acts as a coordinating mechanism of individual ideas, concepts, and images for
how work is accomplished in an organization.
But achieving a shared mental model is no simple task. Individuals develop mental models that are idiosyncratic to their experience, particularly because of work roles, titles, and level in the
organization (Golden, Dukerich, and Fabian, 2000; Ashmos, McDaniel, and Duchon, 1990; Ireland, Hitt, Bettis, and de Porras, 1987).
There is some evidence, however, that individuals at the same organizational level or with similar jobs can develop what Dougherty (1992) terms subcommunities or thought-worlds which reflect
a group mental model. Generally, however, getting people on the
same page means crossing thought-world boundaries and creating
mental models that can include different levels in the organization.
For example, managers and technicians collaborate more effectively
when they go beyond their respective thought-worlds (Drazin,
Glynn, and Kazanjian, 1999).
Mental models allow prediction of future events and determination of causes of events, and they are the basis for making decisions
on appropriate action. When mental models are shared by individuals, those individuals share or possess similar conceptualizations.
Shared mental models, then, connect the actors in the way they
think about what they are doing; thus they facilitate coordination,
foster efficiency, and promote predictability (Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994). Shared mental models are believed to enable better task
performance and processes, as well as more positive attitudes (Cannon- Bowers and Salas, 2001). More specifically, Klimoski and Mohammed (1994) argue that shared mental models affect the speed,
flexibility, and implementation of decision making and thus increase the likelihood that the actors in the organization will better predict the organization’s specific needs, be adaptive, and successfully coordinate their actions. These shared mental models are
thought to function as a frame of reference in guiding and facilitating organizational action (Holyoak, 1984; Duncan and others, 1996).
Finally, shared mental models can be particularly important in the
kind of nonprofit organization we focus on in this study, where
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management and governance responsibilities are not clear and role
ambiguity can make cooperation toward goal achievement both difficult and rare (Hansson, 2006).
If representatives of different thought-worlds are able to share
a mental model of the task processes and goals of their nonprofit
organization, does the organization perform better financially? To
answer this question, we focus on shared understandings between
professional paid leaders and volunteer leaders of thirty-seven
churches, exploring the extent to which shared mental models of
decision-making processes and organizational goals are associated
with improved organizational performance.

Leadership and Shared Mental Models
in Nonprofit Organizations
One of the distinguishing characteristics of many nonprofit organizations is reliance on two types of leaders: paid professionals and
unpaid volunteers. The Girl Scouts, United Way, Planned Parenthood, hospitals, and churches are but a few of the organizations that
rely on both types of leaders for their management. Although paid
leaders exercise leadership in the daily course of managing the organization, volunteers also function as leaders on the board of directors
or advisory committees, where they formulate policy and approve
budgets and key operating decisions. It is likely a mistake to assume
that these two types of leaders enjoy the benefits of shared mental
models just because they are devoted to the same organization.
In this article we focus on shared task mental models. Task mental models represent knowledge structures not only of why a work
group or organization was formed but also of goals to be achieved
and the specific techniques that should be used to achieve the goals
(Cannon-Bowers, Salas, and Converse, 1993; Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994; Mathieu and others, 2000; Cannon-Bowers and Salas,
2001). In other words, a mental task model is essentially an understanding of the nature of “what we do” (Mohammed and Dumville, 2001), and this basic understanding represents the kind of
goal agreement that underlies all organizational activity (Cohen,
Mohrman, and Mohrman, 1999).

Leaders and Shared Task Mental Models
Considerable evidence at the group level of analysis points to
the importance of shared mental models for effective group functioning (Hinsz, Tindale, and Vollrath, 1997; Mathieu and others,
2000; Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 2001). We build on the group-level
research and argue that the same thing should be true at an organization level. Given the important role leadership plays in organizational success, it seems even more important that leaders, not
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just organizational members, have a shared understanding of tasks,
processes, and goals. If leaders have diverse perceptions about critical tasks, resources, and situations, their responses to unexpected
events and environmental surprises are likely to be confused and at
odds with one another, creating an incoherence for organizational
members who are trying to be good followers. If there is little effort at “managing meaning” and leaders hold inconsistent views
about what is important and what critical activities mean, the organization is likely to stumble (Sutcliffe and Weber, 2003). Alternatively, if organizational members and leaders share the same understanding of critical organizational tasks such as organizational goals
and decision processes, they collectively know what needs to be
done, how it will be done, what resource constraints might apply,
and what situational constraints exist. These shared understandings
support a coherence that helps guide the behavior of others.
In this research, we argue that organizations developing shared
task mental models between paid and volunteer leaders outperform
organizations that do not. In these organizations, shared task mental models, which clarify tasks, goals, and processes, produce coherence in the system and better performance. Coordination of disparate actors requires sufficient sharing or overlap of these models
such that a common, collective model informs everyone in the same
way. Some attention has been devoted to development of shared
task mental models in group settings (cf. Cannon-Bowers, Salas,
and Converse, 1993), but it is clear that such models must cross hierarchical boundaries if an organization is to function effectively.

Shared Mental Models of Decision Processes
The decision-making literature has long held that decision outcomes improve when decision-making processes improve (Janis,
1989; Nutt, 2002; Dawes, 1988; Russo and Schoemaker, 1989). Thus,
much attention in the decision-making literature has focused on how
to avoid decision-making mistakes (Russo and Schoemaker, 1989)
that lead to disastrous decision outcomes (Nutt, 2002). Joint or collaborative decision making involving several actors has received a great
deal of attention (cf. Locke and Schweiger, 1979), although its effectiveness is a matter of some debate (cf. Leana, Locke, and Schweiger,
1990). Even though the practical performance consequences of participative or shared decision making are equivocal (Cotton and others,
1988), participative decision making is generally viewed to produce
a useful social outcome: participant buy-in or acceptance of the resulting decision (Wagner and Gooding, 1987; Nutt, 2002). The value
of participation in decision making depends on both the type of decision under consideration and the type of participation involved
(Vroom and Jago, 1978; Cotton and others, 1988). Though participation in decision making is a well-known process, our interest is not
the utility of participation in decision making, but rather the role of
agreeing on the extent of participation in decision processes.
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The socially constructed nature of organizational life (Weick,
1995) led us to consider how participation in decision making
may affect organizational outcomes when people agree on its role
in their organization. The sense-making/interpretation literature
suggests that people make sense of their situations and surroundings, and this shared understanding forms the basis for their organized behavior (Smircich and Stubbart, 1985; Weick, 1995). Organizational life, then, is an exercise in sense making, a way of
developing a “contextual rationality … and negotiated agreements
that attempt to reduce confusion” (Weick, 1993, p. 636). If organizational leaders share the same understanding of organizational
processes, such as participation, and are on the same page about
the extent of participation, such shared understanding ought to
affect the organization positively. Perhaps it is not whether participation occurs in decision making that matters to performance
but the extent to which organizational members agree on the role
of participation in decision making. Participation can occupy a
central role in a democratic system where leaders and members
share an understanding and agree on the importance of members’
roles in organizational decision making. Alternatively, participation may have no role in an autocratic system where leaders and
members agree that members play no part in decision making. It
may be that participation does not matter as much as agreement
on the degree to which participation is used in a given organization. Agreement about participation demonstrates a shared mental model, and it is the reliance and reference to the shared mental model that is important. Thus we hypothesize relationships
between shared task mental models about decision-making processes and organizational performance:
H1: Leaders’ shared task mental models of organization decision processes (participation in decision making) will be positively associated with organizational performance.

Shared Mental Models of Goals
In addition, Hutchins (1995) suggests that redundancy or overlap in group members’ conceptualizations of the group goals or
processes make groups more efficient, because when a tacit understanding is shared there is less need to explain or demonstrate. Others argue that “where the individuals’ knowledge bases are different, teamworking is slowed and complicated” (Sapsed et al., 2002,
p. 81). In addition, Levesque, Wilson, and Wholey (2001) suggest
that in the face of members having differing views of goals, a team
can experience frustration, too much time consumption, and ineffectiveness, whereas shared mental models make coordination easier and efficient. Cohen, Mohrman, and Mohrman (1999) argue that
it is critical for organizations to understand how they can stimulate shared understanding of what the organization is trying to ac-
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complish because it cannot accomplish its goals unless there is clear
agreement on what the goals are. For example, the greater the overlap among members’ task mental models of organizational goals,
the greater the likelihood that members coordinate activities effectively (Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994). Thus a shared understanding of the team’s goals can serve as a foundation for team effectiveness (Cohen, Mohrman, and Mohrman, 1999). Because leaders often
establish the goals of the organization, it is imperative that all levels of leadership share the same mental model as to which goals are
important. Thus we also hypothesize:
H2: Leaders’ shared task mental models of organizational goals
will be positively associated with organizational performance.

Methods
To test these two hypotheses, we developed a study of the
shared mental models of leaders in religious organizations. The research sample consisted of volunteer lay leaders and paid clergy
from thirty-seven churches of a large mainline denomination in the
southwestern United States. A church is an organization dependent
on both paid clergy and laypeople who voluntarily assume leadership roles in carrying out its mission. Hansson (2006) calls churches
the oldest form of nonprofit organization and notes that the governance systems in churches similar to those in our sample are complex, with responsibilities divided between pastors and elected lay
leaders. Such divided governance often results in poor management and conflict (Hansson, 2006). Further, churches are organizations in that their leaders, as in any other organization, must manage people and resources to provide a valuable service (Duncan
and Stocks, 2003). Torry (2005) also makes the point that churches
are a special case of nonprofit voluntary organization, where members perform a variety of roles, which, as Hansson (2006) argued,
results in “messy” hierarchical structures (even though many people experience a strict hierarchy). The messiness of church hierarchies and management systems is further complicated in the United
States by the fact that churches are economically dependent on their
parishioners (Hansson, 2006). Thus lay leaders are not only leaders
but also important clients or customers.
Our initial sample included 180 lay delegates and 83 clergy delegates representing seventy-four churches at the annual conference
of a denomination in a southwestern state. The analyses required us
to match clergy and lay leaders from the same churches, so our final sample included eighty-four laypeople and forty-six clergy representing thirty-seven churches (some churches have more than one
clergy member). Fifty-one percent of the lay leaders were male and
49 percent female. We also had an interest in understanding the tenure, age, and conference participation profile of our sample. Lay
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leaders were on average 52.1 years of age (SD = 12.5), had on average
been a member of the church 16.2 years (SD = 14.3), and had been a
conference delegate 3.6 years (SD = 3.3). In addition, 85 percent were
college graduates; 34 percent held a graduate or professional degree.
The clergy delegates all hold formal positions of authority and
responsibility in their churches. In addition to pastoral duties, they
are also responsible for long-range planning, fundraising, staff supervision, and overall management of the church. Large churches
are served by several clergy members, each of whom can specialize in a management function. The clergy delegates were on average 46.9 years old (SD = 13.1) had on average been a member of the
current church for 8.3 years (SD = 13.1) and a conference delegate
15.4 years (SD = 12.7). Some 84 percent of the clergy were male and
16 percent female. Ninety-six percent of the clergy had a college degree, and 93 percent held a graduate degree. Clergy are typically rotated among churches and so have a shorter tenure at their current
church than the lay delegates.
In this study we rely on debt as an important performance variable. For this measure to be meaningful, however, it is also necessary to consider several important covariates, including congregation size and growth. The churches in this sample had an average
membership of 611 (SD = 628, range 54 to 2,534) and an average
attendance at the principal worship service of 270 (SD = 167). The
churches reported, on average, 4 percent growth in membership
from the previous year. Moreover, they owned property and buildings worth, on average, $1.54 million and carried an average debt
load of $260,609. All data for the churches reported here are taken
from the denomination’s annual report and are considered official
and accurate for each church. The church data are not estimates
made by conference attendees.

Procedure
Questionnaire data were collected from lay leaders and clergy
members who participated as conference delegates at a regional
conference for churches. The lay leaders who completed the questionnaire were selected for attendance at this conference because
they occupy leadership positions within their congregation. These
leaders are not only active in their churches but also work closely
with the clergy on church initiatives, such as administrative boards,
program councils, finance committees, and so forth, and also participate in evaluating clergy performance. Thus they are influential
in strategic management of the church and are not “subordinate”
managers in a traditional hierarchical sense. The delegates completed questionnaires that addressed a broad range of issues relevant to church activities and conference procedures as part of their
conference activities. Although individual leaders of a given congregation may vary in their tenure as members, the leaders of a con-
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gregation are furnishing reports of the goals and decision-making
processes of their church at a given point in time.

Boundary Conditions
The study focused on the kinds of task mental models needed to
manage church operations. Many other kinds of mental models—
on matters of faith, belief, and church doctrine—are not part of the
current study. Also, our interest in this study is to examine these
task models at a particular point in time, to better understand their
relationships with organizational performance.

Independent Variables
Organizational decision-making processes. Respondents rated four
items on a seven-point Likert scale measuring the extent of the laity’s participation in decision-making processes for their church (for
example, “Laypeople in my church have the authority to make decisions about church goals and activities”). All items are listed in the
Appendix. Following is a discussion of how these items were operationalized to capture the shared task mental model of decisionmaking processes.
Organizational goals. Respondents rated the importance that their
church places on seven organizational goals on a seven-point Likert
scale developed by a conference advisory group and representing
the most common goals within this church denomination (among
them “revitalization of local churches” and “providing educational
resources”).
Shared task mental models. We assessed shared task mental models by calculating a measure of agreement, consistent with Ensley and Pearce (2001) and Levesque, Wilson, and Wholey (2001). A
high degree of agreement represents cognitive overlap across the
paid and volunteer leaders’ responses. Both lay leaders and clergy
possess a shared understanding, and thus a shared mental model,
of task issues within each organization. This approach means calculating the within-group interrater reliability (James, Demaree,
and Wolf, 1984) for the decision-making processes and goals associated with accomplishing church tasks for each church. Thus we
operationalized shared task mental models using what is essentially a measure of the extent to which the conference participants
(both lay and clergy) agree on the nature of decision-making processes and goals at their church. We calculated separate measures of
agreement, one for organizational decision making and one for organizational goals, using the self-reported organizational decisionmaking and goals survey items for each church’s group of leaders.
The average score for task mental models of decision-making processes was .88 (SD = .21) and for task mental models of organizational goals was .80 (SD = .20). Values for shared mental models of
decision-making processes and goals could range from 0 to 1, with
values closer to 1 meaning more agreement. The values for agree-
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ment on the decision process scale ranged from 0.23 to 1.00, suggesting that despite the democratic traditions of this denomination
there is wide variation across churches of this same denomination
regarding agreement about laity participation in decision making.
Although there was some risk of social desirability for everyone to
indicate that participation in decision making does occur given the
democratic traditions of the church, we did not find this to be true;
if all respondents had put high scores on this scale, then we would
have seen 100 percent agreement. The ratings for goals ranged from
0.28 to 1, suggesting that even though particular teachings or doctrine may suggest the importance of one given goal over another,
variation exists in what leaders view as the most important goals of
their respective churches.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in the current study is debt. Borrowing
money is a management issue and decision that has considerable
long-term implications for churches. More important, churches of
various denominations, as well as their stakeholders, use the level
of debt to evaluate financial stability and performance (Jordan,
Thompson, and Malley, 1991; Eltringham, 1994; Kochhar, 1996; Kochhar and Hitt, 1998; O’Brien, 2003; “Keeping Faith,” 2004; Daniels,
2003; LaRue, 2003).
The average debt for the thirty-seven churches in the sample
was $260,609. However, there was considerable variability (SD =
$487,890). Some fifteen churches carried no debt at all, while the other
twenty-two churches carried debt ranging from $1,000 to $2,257,974.

Control Variables
In this study, we rely on debt as an important performance variable. For this measure to be meaningful, however, it is necessary to
consider several important covariates, including congregation size
and growth. Even though churches might prefer to avoid debt, many
of them, particularly large churches, are increasingly taking on more
debt. In a study of 296 Protestant churches, LaRue (2004) reports
that 52 percent of the responding churches are in debt, with mortgages and lines of credit being the primary vehicles. Nearly nine out
of ten large churches are in debt, as compared to just one-third of
small churches. Since 2001, the percent of large churches in debt has
jumped significantly, increasing from 67 to 87 percent (LaRue, 2004).
As a result, we control for church size in this analysis through the
average attendance at the principal worship. The measure is deemed
appropriate over total membership, because those who attend the
principal worship no doubt are the active members of the church.
The churches with no debt have an average attendance of 330
(range 54 to 1,095), while the churches carrying debt have an average attendance of 803 (range 67 to 2,534), and their average debt is
$416,045. The correlation in these data between debt and member-

211

212

Over time,
if left
unattended,
debt indicates
churches are
being poorly
managed and
are essentially
failing.
Greater debt
in the analyses
reported here
is indicative of
generally poor
management
practices.

Solansky

et al. in

N o n p r o f i t M a n a g e m e n t & L e a d e r s h i p 19 (2008)

ship is .40 (p < .05). Because of the size bias, attendance at principal
worship service is used as a covariate.
Despite a general reluctance to take on debt, there is a situation
in which debt might be seen as necessary: the situation of growth.
Similar to operation of businesses in the private sector, income generally lags behind growth; yet the growing business (or in this case,
the growing church) cannot wait for the finances to catch up, particularly if it needs capital expenditures such as land, buildings, and
parking lots. The analyses reported here also control for growth.
The churches in the sample report an average growth rate of 4 percent (SD = .08). Although smaller churches can grow faster than
large churches on a percentage basis (because they have a smaller
baseline), the correlation between size and growth is .03 (ns), suggesting no relationship between size and growth.
When both size and growth are accounted for, one concludes that
debt is taken on by churches to sustain ongoing operations. This may
be seen (and justified) as a short-term necessity, but over time, if left
unattended, debt indicates such churches are being poorly managed
and are essentially failing. Thus greater debt in the analyses reported
here is indicative of generally poor management practices.

Analysis
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations
of all variables. In general, our results showed significant correlations between the independent variables (task mental models on
decision-making processes and goals) and the dependent variable
(debt). Limited collinearity is evidenced through the nonsignificant
correlations among the independent variables.
Next, we used hierarchical regression analyses to test the two
hypotheses. Table 2 shows the models tested. Model 1 presents the
control variable analysis and model 2 presents a full model that includes all the variables. When size and growth are controlled for,
both shared task mental models for decision-making processes

Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Variables

Mean

Debt
$260,609.86
Task mental model:
0.88
decision-making processes
Task mental model: goals
0.80
Size
270.95
Growth
0.04
N = 37
*** p = .001 ; ** p < .01 ; * p < .05

SD
$487,890.61
0.21
0.20
167.46
0.08

1
1
–0.57***

2

3

4

5

1

–0.43** 0.21
0.40* –0.38*
0.03
–0.01

1
–0.15
–0.16

1
–0.20

1
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Table 2. Results of Regression Analyses for Debt
Variables

Model 1

Growth
.11
Size
.42*
Task mental model: decision process		
Task mental model: goals		
R2
.17
Change in R2		
F
3.48*

Model 2
.02
.20
–.43**
–.31*
.46
.29
8.36***

N = 37
*** p = .001 ; ** p < .01 ; * p < .05

and goals are significantly and negatively related to church debt;
in other words, a higher level of agreement is associated with less
debt. Because church debt is viewed as poor management, we expected this negative relationship. Thus we found support for hypotheses 1 and 2.

Discussion
This article suggests that task mental models shared across two
types of leaders in the churches we surveyed are associated with
improved organizational performance. Having leaders on the same
page makes a difference. The findings are important because previous research has established the importance of shared mental models for effective team functioning. We build on that research and
examine the impact of task mental models shared across organizational levels (volunteer and paid leaders) and organization performance in nonprofit organizations. The more that both clergy and
lay leaders share a task mental model, the better the churches perform. Organizational effectiveness improves because when leaders
rely on task mental models, an organizational coherence emerges
from this shared meaning. Leaders operating in different spheres—
paid and volunteer— cannot easily integrate their substantially differing frames of reference unless they develop shared understanding of both goals and processes (Mohammed and Dumville, 2001).
The impact of shared mental models is true for both “autocratic”
churches and “democratic” ones. Being on the same page, or agreeing that this is what we are and this is how we operate, is more important than the type of decision-making processes and goals.
The idea of shared task mental models seems especially important to the study of nonprofit organizations because of their complex nature. Drucker (1990) points out that a basic difference between nonprofit organizations and businesses is that the nonprofit
organization has so many more critical relationships to contend
with than does a business. Thus managing the complex set of relationships requires attention to how information is shared among all
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the actors in the organization and how the organization is understood and perceived by various actors.
Our findings suggest areas for further research as well as specific implications for leaders in nonprofit organizations. Traditional
hierarchies can be effective in ensuring an orderly, efficient routine
process, but there are many organizations for which the hierarchical model will not work effectively. For example, the churches studied in this article cannot ensure hierarchical compliance because the
professional leaders are not necessarily the “bosses” of the volunteer leaders. Professional staff (clergy in our case) are appointed
and evaluated by the volunteers (lay leaders), many of whom
might be more accomplished managers than the professional staff.
The clergy possess a certain moral authority, but their effectiveness will depend on articulating and pursuing a shared purpose beyond theology. The organization prospers because its members believe in the importance of the shared purpose of “how we operate”
as a church. Members can then voluntarily act in ways that benefit
the church, not because they are commanded to do so but because
they are aware of and committed to the church’s tasks. The leaders’
(both clergy and lay) purpose is to come to understand with greater
clarity the nature and features of the tasks.
Consider that the effectiveness of a shared mental model approach to leadership will likely be true in any organization (academic setting, hospital, research setting) where the employees possess greater technical knowledge and skill than the managers, and it
is the technical knowledge and skill that is the reason for the organization’s existence. These are all workplaces where formal leaders and
managers cannot rely on the legitimate power conferred by a hierarchical system. A hospital administrator cannot tell a doctor how to
perform an operation; a dean cannot tell a faculty member what kind
of research to pursue. But these formal leaders and managers can emphasize the importance of high-quality medical care or high-quality
research as a necessary part of their collective system—not telling the
“subordinate” what to do, but rather reminding the subordinate of
the meaning of his or her contribution. Similarly, nonprofit organizations such as the Red Cross, Girl Scouts, and United Way cannot deal
with volunteers by invoking hierarchical legitimacy; rather, these organizations, like the churches in our study, are better served by having leaders work toward being on the same page.
Several limitations to the research must be noted. First, our
need to have both clergy and lay reports from the same church reduced our sample, even though a sample of thirty-seven organizations would not normally be considered much of a weakness.
Another limitation is that the data are cross-sectional. Although
cross-sectional designs generally motivate a higher level of informant participation than longitudinal studies, they lack the capability to show any development or change (Cook and Campbell, 1979;
Kerlinger and Lee, 2000). We cannot make any kind of causal infer-
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ence; nor can we comment on how the management of the churches
may have evolved or changed. Also, our study paints with a broad
brush. A different research approach, such as a longitudinal qualitative design, would be needed to capture the social dynamics inside each church. A third limitation is the use of a survey to capture
task processes. Although this is a commonly used approach in assessing shared mental models (Peterson, Mitchell, Thompson, and
Burr, 2000; Yoo and Kanawattanachai, 2001; Levesque, Wilson, and
Wholey, 2001), surveys have distinct disadvantages. For example,
they present issues in the researcher’s voice, not the informant’s.
Moreover, surveys cannot capture the depth, breadth, and texture
that is possible in applying qualitative techniques. Field observations might prove to be better suited to capturing the relationship
between cognitive processes and organizational behaviors.

Conclusion
Traditional command-and-control hierarchy presumes that
managerial coherence results from everyone doing what they are
told. In such a system, a shared understanding of task depends on
little more than a leader’s ability to be clear in issuing orders, but
such clarity is never ensured because the leader and the subordinate operate from fundamentally different cognitive perspectives.
This research, in contrast, proceeds on the premise that a leader is
not necessarily an issuer of orders but rather a catalyst for shared
understanding. If leaders reside at different places in the organization, their efforts to enable shared meaning will do far more for the
organization’s performance than ensuring mere compliance down
the hierarchy. The conversation resulting from an effort to understand meaning will ensure more comprehensive understanding of
the collective purpose. Therefore, being on the same page about
the collective purpose, not the hierarchy, becomes the integrating
mechanism for the organization.
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Appendix: Measures from Survey
Decision processes (1 = not true; 7 = true), Cronbach’s α = .83
1. The views of the laypeople who hold leadership positions at
my church make a difference in the “big” decisions that get
made at my church.
2. The views of laypeople regarding “big” decisions are sought
by the clergy in my church.
3. Laypeople in my church have the authority to make decisions
about church goals and activities.
4. Laypeople influence decisions regarding new programs and
activities in my church.
List of potential goals (1 = not important; 7 = extremely important)
1. Revitalization of local churches
2. Apportionments
3. Developments of lay leadership abilities
4. Clergy professional development
5. Assisting local churches with stewardship
6. Providing educational resources
7. Hispanic ministries
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